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With our ground forces sweeping down the central plains with so little opposition that close air coordination became unnecessary, General Whitehead's airmen had turned their undivided attention to Clark. B-24s came in with tons of demolition bombs. Low-flying B-25s, A-20s, P-38s and P-47s crisscrossed the lush target with devastating effect. Concentrated .50 caliber fire, parafrags and parademos destroyed scores of planes on the ground, blasted flak defenses, hangers and administration buildings, and slaughtered Jap defenders who darted about in frantic effort to escape the sweeping fire that covered the area like a blanket. In the air Jap interceptors were knocked down as fast as they closed in for battle.
Clark Field as a Jap aerial stronghold was done for. Enemy ground forces continued stiff resistance in the nearby hills but the air center was securely in our hands by the first few days of February.
A scene of complete devastation greeted our occupation troops at the air center. Hundreds of Jap aircraft, all types, were scattered, twisted, burned and bullet-ridden throughout the area. Others were found in relatively undamaged condition, affording our technical experts a happy hunting ground. Our emplacements were completely smashed, hangers and other buildings were demolished, and our runways were pitted with bomb craters.
More than 200 new aircraft engines, some uncrated, were found buried under houses, in churchyards and beneath rice mills in a nearby village. Gasoline in 20 barrel batches was found underground in scattered areas. Even generators and wheels had been cached in shallow pits all over the center. A number of underground shops were discovered, complete with electric power and generators.
The Japs had dispersed their planes over a wide range of territory. Some units were found more than two miles from the nearest runway.
While our engineers rushed in with their heavy equipment to repair and construct runways for our use, other enemy airfields throughout Luzon were being neutralized. Our B-24s also began to strike Formosa's vast network of airfields in earnest. The Japs soon became wary of coming up for a fight, whether the heavies were escorted or not.
Although some 20 of Formosa's airdromes were known to have held more than 400 aircraft during the last two weeks of January, our bombers went about their work with negligible opposition. Insulting jibes radioed to the Jap bases by confident aircrewmen failed to get them off the ground A sample taunt was this announcement by one of our pilots:
"Aren't you boys happy that you won't have to patrol this area any longer? We are taking over the job now."
An indication of the steady reduction of Jap air strength and the increasing reluctance of enemy pilots to oppose our planes can be gained by figures on enemy aircraft shot down over Luzon during the first three months of this year: January, 184; February, 14, and March, 4.
Meanwhile our ground forces had bypassed the heavily-defended Fort Stotsenburg area and the advance toward Manila was continuing steadily. Enemy troops in the north, however, were fighting even more furiously as our drive in that direction threatened the remaining escape route from the south into the Cagayan Valley.
Bloody battles were taking place in the hills around San Manuel, San Nicholas, Umnigan, San Jose, Munoz and Rizal. It was in this sector that the Japs finally committed the armored division which had been held in readiness down in the central plains, but it was not employed in striking force. The enemy used it piecemeal in counter-attacks and in antitank operations. With air power again aiding with low-level strikes, our forces took advantage of this tactical boner, and the Jap soon lost his armored division. Remnants--minus armor--fled to the high country in the north.
As our troops entered the city on Manila and other invasion forces pushed inland from beachheads in the Zambales, Subic Bay, Bataan and Batangas areas, Gen. George C. Kenney took stock of the Luzon accomplishments of his Far East Air Forces. The figures were extremely gratifying. From January 1 through February 30, our aircraft, under the tactical direction of the 5th Air Force, had flown every day, despite frequently inclement weather; had dropped 47,485 tons of bombs, expended 28,500 rounds of 20 mm ammunition and 3,060,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.
The General studied an impressive array of targets struck. One thousand, five hundred sorties against Luzon's airfields; 1,600 more against targets of opportunity which included roving strikes on troop concentrations, gun emplacements--any enemy activity that chanced to meet the eyes of our recon pilots. More than 1,800 sorties were flown against bridges, roads, buildings, shipping and factories.
In the record was a request from one of our ground commanders that planes cease destroying locomotives and rolling stock before our own extended supply lines suffered for lack of salvaged enemy railway equipment. Another ground commander had wondered jokingly why our planes couldn't "just blast the center spans out of bridges without blowing up the revetments 100 yards away and ripping up 300 feet of good concrete highway."
For the period, our losses had been extremely low: 26 fighters and 38 bombers destroyed or missing.
The battle for the southern section of Manila had entered its tragic stage of bloody, building-to-building, floor-to-floor fighting and wanton destruction by disorganized, fanatical Jap troops. Most of the larger buildings had been used as enemy arsenals, and when the stubborn defenders were driven from one after another they set off charges that laid waste blocks at a time.
One Allied demolition expert, who had served in the Mediterranean theater, said the explosions that rocked Manila were never equaled in Italy, not even at Cassino.
While our forces from the north pushed across the Pasig River, other troops entered Manila from the south after a successful landing on West Batangas and an airborne operations on Tagayatay Ridge.
Manila finally fell on March 2. By the time the city was securely in our hands, the Japs on Luzon were left without any capability for offensive operations. But the enemy commanders were quick to make the most of defensive delay by withdrawing all forces to the rugged terrain east of Manila, to Batangas south of Laguna De Bay, and to the mountains guarding the approaches to the Gagayan Valley in north Luzon.
This enemy defense has called for the closest air-ground coordination. Our bomb-carrying fighters have gone in time and again only a few yards ahead of our ground troops to blast the Japs out of caves and natural barriers.
The commanding general of one division reported he had "never seen such air cooperation, and up to this time I did not think it possible." Another commented that "our troops have entered areas standing up and smiling."
On March 16, when the battle for Luzon had settled into a stage of slow progress against final desperate defense, Gen. Walter Krueger told General Whitehead that the cooperation of air units with the 6th Army "is superb and is assisting materially in the taking of our objectives and in holding our own battle casualties to a minimum."
As in Europe, air power in the Philippines had many times proved its indispensability.
Without it, the Jap on Luzon was lost; with it, Allied forces pressed on toward final victory in the Far East.
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